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Invariant Causal Mechanisms
David Waldner
University of Virginia
Why Causal Mechanisms are Not Variables
Qualitative methodologists generally treat process tracing
methods and a mechanistic view of causation as natural allies.
Two conjoined propositions form the basis for this alliance.
The first proposition is that the identification of causal mecha-
nisms is the sine qua non of distinguishing causal relations
from mere correlations. The second proposition is that pro-
cess-tracing methods are uniquely qualified to identify these
critical causal mechanisms. In one admirably pithy formula-
tion, Gary Goertz and James Mahoney state categorically: “No
strong causal inference without process tracing.”1 There ap-
pears to be a tacit consensus that process tracing is both
necessary and sufficient for causal inference.
One can applaud the development of process-tracing meth-
ods without making such strong claims on its behalf. It would
behoove us, first of all, to distinguish causal inference from
causal explanation. We make inferences about the existence of
a causal relationship by claiming that an observed association
is not merely correlational. We can do this qualitatively, by
making claims about necessary and sufficient conditions, or
we can do this quantitatively, by making claims about unbi-
ased estimates of causal effects. Philosophers who are in gen-
eral sympathetic to mechanistic conceptions of causation have
been quick to point out that inferences can and frequently are
made without explicit reference to causal mechanisms.2 Even
as we affirm that the analysis of causal mechanisms can be a
powerful tool in causal inference, there is no reason to reject
experiments and design-based statistical studies as equally
powerful instruments of causal inference.3 We make causal
explanations, on the other hand, by invoking causes. In previ-
ous work, I have argued that a complete causal explanation
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requires the identification of the relevant mechanisms, but even
on this point, philosophers sympathetic to a mechanistic per-
spective on mechanisms dissent; Harold Kincaid, to give one
example, has argued cogently that no universal claim for mecha-
nism-based explanation is reasonable.4
Moreover, reading various literatures on the discovery of
causal mechanisms in disparate scientific disciplines makes it
hard to credit the claim that “process-tracing methods are ar-
guably the only method that allows us to study causal mecha-
nisms.”5 It may be the case that process-tracing methods are
particularly well-suited to studying mechanisms in social sci-
ence fields like Political Science, but this claim requires an
auxiliary argument about why the social sciences differ from
natural sciences and why that difference makes process trac-
ing particularly well suited for studying social science mecha-
nisms.
Finally, it is worth revisiting the vexing question of whether
our current conceptual understanding of causal mechanisms
is adequate to the tremendous inferential and explanatory bur-
dens we process tracers place upon them. In a 2001 review
essay, James Mahoney identified approximately two-dozen
definitions of causal mechanisms. Somewhat alarmingly,
Mahoney noted that many of these definitions do not clearly
distinguish causation from correlation.6 In the intervening
years, political scientists have made some important progress
defining causal mechanisms, yet skeptics remain, even among
political scientists who are sympathetic to process tracing.7
Much more work remains to be done: a recent commentary on
process-tracing methods by a sympathetic philosopher con-
cludes that “the social science literature has been preoccupied
more with how mechanisms are found or theorized, and with
the role they play in explanation and theory, and less with
developing a definition that captures the essential elements of
mechanisms or that applies to all scientific contexts.”8
Yet it is not clear that we can make much progress by way
of definition.  Many of us, myself included, endorse a “genera-
tive” definition of causal mechanisms, as entities that generate
an outcome of interest.9 There are various definitions in the
philosophical literature that expand on this core definition, but
all of them ultimately contain some version of the claim that
causal mechanisms produce an outcome. Thus, we end up
defining causation in terms of causal mechanisms and causal
mechanisms in terms of generating or producing outcomes—
that is to say, in terms of causation.
My recommendation is that we put an end to worrying
about a unified and singular definition of causal mechanisms
and that we instead focus on what property a mechanism must
possess in order to perform its inferential and explanatory func-
tions. By distinguishing properties from functions, my inten-
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tion is to advance the debate without trafficking in tautology.
The property I wish to emphasize is invariance. Definitionally,
invariance is a property of a system that remains unchanged
under some transformation. For example, the area of a surface
remains unchanged if the surface is rotated in space, a prop-
erty known as rotational invariance. In my usage, invariance is
a property of an entity in a causal system that remains un-
changed under intervention. We intervene on variables, set-
ting them to new values; that intervention produces changes
in other variables that are causal effects of the variable on
which we intervened. Stated colloquially, wiggle the cause and
the effect wiggles too; flip a light switch and the light turns on
and off. To refer to mechanisms as possessing the property of
invariance, then, is to claim that mechanisms are those ele-
ments of a causal system that we cannot wiggle.
To explore invariance further, let’s highlight what it is not.
First, invariance is not determinism. Determinism is a property
of a causal relationship between singular events (token causa-
tion) or variables (type causation).10 To claim that mechanisms
are invariant neither implies determinism nor precludes it; to
insist that invariance is equivalent to determinism is to make a
category error.
Furthermore, mechanisms embodying the property of in-
variance are neither intervening variables nor systems of vari-
ables connected by arrows. Andrew Bennett, in this sympo-
sium, attributes to me the idea that mechanisms are systems of
variables connected by arrows,11 but as the following discus-
sion should make clear, I do not subscribe to either view of
causal mechanisms. To see why not, it will be helpful to invoke
the concept of a causal graph. A causal graph is nothing but a
set of vertices or nodes, representing random variables, and a
set of edges, representing postulated relations of statistical
dependence. When edges have arrowheads, they denote di-
rection and asymmetry; arrows represent postulated causal
relations. Finally, when a path from a node does not return to
itself, the graph is acyclic.  These causal graphs are thus di-
rected acyclic graphs.
It is common among both philosophers and social scien-
tists to see references to causal mechanisms as mediators in a
causal graph, as in X     M     Y, where X and Y are the indepen-
dent and dependent variables, respectively, and M is the
mechanism.12 There is great value in thinking about causal
relations in terms of mediating variables. Doing so produces
more extensive causal chains that have the methodological
virtue of increasing the opportunity for falsification and the
explanatory virtue of providing richer detail and depth. But it
seems futile to identify these mediators with causal mecha-
nisms, for they simply reproduce the relationship of correla-
tion between variables that we are seeking to transcend. In-
deed, there is nothing ontologically distinct about mediators
as a type of random variable; whether a variable is a mediator
10
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or not depends on nothing but the construction of the causal
model and the placement of the nodes. A variable that is a
mediator in one causal graph may just as easily be a non-
mediator in another.
Alternatively, we can think of the entire causal graph as a
causal mechanism in terms of a system of interacting parts.
This view is widely held among philosophers, especially in the
literature on biological mechanisms. Rosa Runhardt, in this
symposium. adopts this view, citing Machamer, Darden, and
Craver 2000 to refer to the causal structure A    B    C as the
schematic representation of a mechanism, with each of A, B,
and C conceptualized as independent stages of the mecha-
nism.13 Stuart Glennan defines a mechanism for a behavior as
“a complex system that produces that behavior by the interac-
tion of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts
can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating gen-
eralizations.’’14 Social scientists have followed suit. Carly
Knight and Christopher Winship define a mechanism as “a
causal relationship involving one or more intervening vari-
ables between a treatment and an outcome.”15 Proponents of
this approach, both philosophers and social scientists, offer
the toy model of a car’s engine as this type complex mecha-
nism or system. As Alexander Gebharter explains, “The ques-
tion of why a car speeds up when the gas pedal is pressed can
be answered by pointing at/describing the underlying mecha-
nism (i.e., the motor and how it is connected to the gas pedal,
the wheels, the gas tank, etc).”16 Derek Beach and Rasmus
Pedersen offer the identical analogy, with X as the motor, Y the
car’s movement, and “the driveshaft and wheels can be thought
of as the causal mechanism that transmits forces from X (mo-
tor) to produce Y (movement).”17
Indeed, an automobile’s mechanical components comport
well with the idea of a complex system of interacting parts
whose interactions can be characterized by direct, invariant,
change-relating generalizations: under most circumstances,
step on the accelerator and the car moves faster. But some-
thing critical is missing from this conception of mechanisms
and the toy model that instantiates it. Most automobiles are
still powered by gasoline and gas-powered engines are inter-
nal combustion engines. To think of the mechanical parts of an
engine as the causal mechanism is to exclude combustion from
the causal explanation of how automobiles work. We can say
something further: the mechanical parts of an automobile are
variables, and as variables, we can intervene to turn each vari-
able to a new value. Combustion, on the other hand, cannot be
turned off; it is an exothermic chemical reaction that occurs
under proper conditions. Each of those conditions—heat, oxy-
gen, and a fuel—can be turned on or off, just as any random
13
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variable in a causal graph can be turned on or off. But if heat,
oxygen, and a fuel are all present, combustion occurs. One
cannot throw a lit match into a pool of gasoline in the presence
of oxygen and the absence of any other flame retardant and
then somehow intervene to turn off combustion. That makes
combustion different from a random variable, for in a causal
graph, to repeat, one can, in principle, intervene to set any of
the variables to a new value.
In what way does combustion differ from the intercon-
nected parts of an engine? As I describe below, combustion
has the property of invariance. We invoke mechanisms to ex-
plain relations between variables; to perform this function,
mechanisms cannot themselves be variables. Relations between
variables, after all, are described by correlations, and we typi-
cally believe that causal inference and explanation are based
on something beyond correlation. Therefore, we cannot be
satisfied by defining mechanisms as intervening variables or
as systems of variables.
What does it mean to define mechanisms as entities fea-
turing the property of invariance? To understand invariance,
we must recognize the critical distinction between causation
and constitution. Causation refers to a particular type of rela-
tion of dependence between events (which can be coded as
variables, at the aggregate level). Causal relations are tempo-
ral—they occur over time—and asymmetric, in that the ma-
nipulation of a cause produces an effect but the manipulation
of the effect does not produce the cause. Causation implies
etiology, in that we explain outcomes by detailing the causal
path that led to them. Constitution, on the other hand, is about
the fundamental nature of a phenomenon.  As such, constitu-
tion is atemporal and provides no opportunity for manipula-
tion.  Consider the prosaic example of a batted baseball that
strikes and shatters a glass window. The causal story has two
events, the striking of the glass by the ball and the subsequent
shattering of the glass. The two events are separated in time,
albeit only briefly separated. There is asymmetry of manipula-
tion: by striking the glass with the ball, the glass shatters; but
shattering the glass does not cause it to be struck by the ball.
The causal mechanism, on the other hand, is the inherent fra-
gility of the glass, which is constituted by its molecular struc-
ture. “To be fragile is to have a particular molecular structure;
the fragility is not a consequence of the molecular structure.”18
Similarly, combustion takes place when a fuel-oxygen mixture
is exposed to heat due to the structure of dioxide molecules
(their angular spin and momentum) such that oxygen molecules
assault hydrocarbon molecules, converting them into molecules
of water and carbon dioxide and releasing tremendous amounts
of heat in the process.
Invariant Causal Mechanisms and
Qualitative Causal Inference
Where does this discussion of invariant causal mechanisms
get us? Elsewhere I have argued that process tracing should
satisfy a “completeness standard,” consisting of four elements:
a relatively complete causal graph representing the process
18
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being traced, an event-history map representing the events of
a particular case that correspond to a particular realization of
the causal graph, a set of descriptive inferences from the event-
history map to the causal graph (it is here that Bayesian updat-
ing can be extremely useful), and, finally, a full set of causal
mechanisms.19 What constitutes a full set of mechanisms? The
arrows in the causal graph that connect random variables de-
note the underlying causal mechanism. We can intervene on
random variables but we cannot intervene on the causal mecha-
nisms that generate causal connection. This is precisely the
meaning of invariance. Thus, for a causal graph with N di-
rected edges (connecting N + 1 random variables, in many
cases), there must be N causal mechanisms.
Let me give one quick example that should help us distin-
guish causal graphs from causal mechanisms. Figure 1 is the
causal graph that I have previously reconstructed from
Elisabeth Wood’s analysis of insurgency and democratic tran-
sitions in El Salvador and South Africa.20 The graph has seven
nodes, each representing a random variable, and six directed
edges, each connecting two of the random variables. By my
account, this causal graph has to be supplemented by event-
history maps supported by evidence (individual chapters of
the book perform this task) and by six invariant causal mecha-
nisms, one mechanism for each arrow.  Let’s consider one such
mechanism linking the third and fourth nodes in the graph: by
what mechanism does insurgent collective action reshape eco-
nomic structures to make them less reliant on the repression of
labor? In her African case study, Wood articulates this causal
mechanism as a decision-theoretic model of how investor con-
fidence in the profitability of apartheid institutions was eroded
by worker collective action leading to the suspension of in-
vestment in South Africa by both domestic and foreign capi-
talists. Wood derives two states of the world from the com-
parative statics of the model, one in which the political control
of labor keeps wages below what they would be in a liberal
market economy and one in which worker mobilization raises
wages to above their level set by a liberal market economy.
Worker mobilization thus changes elite preferences over labor
market conditions and hence over political regimes. Wood then
compiles considerable evidence that her model best depicts
actual events, and is thus superior to several plausible alterna-
tive mechanisms.21
This brief summary does not do justice to either Wood’s
theoretical model of the causal mechanism or her empirical
confirmation of the mechanism. But it is sufficient to support
two claims. First, causal mechanisms are distinct from either
mediating nodes in a causal graph or the entire set of nodes in
the causal graph. Second, causal mechanisms are invariant
insofar as their fundamental constitutive features constrain
their actions. Wood, like other advocates of rational-actor
models, conceives of human beings as fundamentally endowed
with intentionality and rationality and hence acting in ways
19
 Waldner 2015a, 2015b, 2015c.
20
 Wood 2000. For my discussion of this work as an exemplar of
process tracing, see Waldner 2015a, 137–141.
21
 Wood 2000, 143–168.
31
Qualitative & Multi-Method Research, Spring/Fall 2016
that maximize some objective function. This is not the only
possible interpretation of how the constitution of agency con-
strains action and so I concur with Rosa Runhardt’s observa-
tion, in this symposium, that “units in social science mecha-
nisms are not as clearly defined as biological entities.”22
What is the payoff of conceptualizing process tracing in
terms of causal graphs, event-history maps, and invariant causal
mechanisms? Doing so gives process tracers a principled re-
sponse to the fundamental problem of causal inference. The
fundamental problem of causal inference is derived from the
Rubin Causal Model, also known as the potential-outcomes
framework, which defines a causal effect as the difference in a
response variable between a unit under treatment and the same
unit under control. The problem of inference at the unit level is
a problem of missing data: one cannot observe a unit under
treatment and under control simultaneously; one or the other
state of the world cannot be observed and so one cannot
observe the two quantities needed to infer the causal effect.
This claim, if left uncontested, would seem to undermine the
possibility of within-case causal analysis. Many qualitative
scholars simply ignore this fundamental problem of causal in-
ference, while others explicitly reject it as part of a quantitative
perspective that is simply not relevant to the concerns or the
philosophical commitments of qualitative scholars.23
My approach to process tracing—the combination of
causal graphs, event-history maps, and invariant causal mecha-
nisms, aka the “completeness standard”—is based on the pre-
supposition that process tracing would only be strengthened
by directly engaging the fundamental problem of causal infer-
ence. The outlines of a principled response to the fundamental
problem of causal inference would rely on what Paul Holland
calls the “scientific solution,” a third option to experiments
with random assignment to treatment and design-based statis-
tical inference. The scientific solution relies on exploiting “vari-
ous homogeneity or invariance assumptions.”24 My claim is
that a fully specified causal model that is fully identified by the
22
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relevant invariant causal mechanisms can be used to satisfy
this invariance assumption. Insofar as one has the full set of
invariant causal mechanisms, one can use the fully identified
causal model as a substitute for the missing observations about
the counterfactual states of the world. To use the informal
example favored by Donald Rubin, we can make unit-level causal
inferences about the effects of aspirin on relief from the pain of
a headache because we can produce causal graphs represent-
ing pathways from damaged cells to the production of a chain
on enzymes to signals sent to the pain center of the brain, and
also because we understand the nature of neurotransmitters
and their receptors and how their activities are constrained by
their fundamental structures. We can, in other words, tell the
causal story in terms of etiology and in terms of constitution,
and, in doing so, we can resolve the fundamental problem of
causal inference.25
Response to Andrew Bennett’s
Comments in This Symposium
In his contribution to this symposium, Andrew Bennett doubts
my claim that the completeness standard constitutes a poten-
tial solution to the fundamental problem of causal inference.26
His critical interrogation has two components, a discussion of
mechanisms and a discussion of evidence. On mechanisms,
Bennett equates my approach to mechanisms to Judea Pearl’s
explication of causal graphs and to James Woodward’s ma-
nipulation account of causation.27 I emphatically dissent from
this characterization of my position. I consider causal mecha-
nisms to be ontologically distinct from causal graphs; indeed,
that distinction must be made since the completeness stan-
dard calls for both causal graphs and causal mechanisms, with
one mechanism corresponding to each arrow in the causal
graph.
Let me say a few more words to explain why I consider
causal graphs and causal mechanisms to be irreducibly dis-
tinct elements of a causal explanation. In Pearl’s account, causal
graphs represent relations of probabilistic dependence; these
25
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graphs are causal only insofar as we invoke the Causal Markov
Condition, which states, informally, that in the causal graph X
    M    Y, the value of Y depends only on its direct causal
relation to M such that after conditioning on M, Y is statisti-
cally independent of X. Let me state emphatically: At no point
in my account is causal inference predicated upon the Causal
Markov Condition. I consider probabilistic dependence to be
only a consequence of a causal relationship and not constitu-
tive of that relationship.
Woodward, on the other hand, presents a manipulationist
account of causation. Recognizing that many relations of
counterfactual dependence are not causal in nature, Wood-
ward restricts causal relations to a subset of relations of
counterfactual dependence such that X is a cause of Y only in
the case that an ideal intervention on X—setting it to a new
value—also changes the value of Y without changing the value
of any other variable that is not on the pathway between X and
Y. Woodward occasionally refers to his account as mechanis-
tic. Yet the key distinction that Woodward preserves is be-
tween difference-making accounts of causation and produc-
tion accounts of causation.28 Woodward’s account is unam-
biguously a difference-making account, which does not as-
sign any role to mechanisms, while my own is a production
account that requires causal mechanisms. One possible source
of Bennett’s mistaken conflation of my approach with Wood-
ward’s is that I use the term invariance, a term that is central to
Woodward’s account as well. Yet we use that term in very
distinct ways. For Woodward, invariance is a predicate of a
generalization; empirical generalizations linking X and Y are
causal if they are invariant under a range of interventions. In
my account, on the other hand, invariance is a predicate of
mechanisms; it is for this reason that I invoke the fundamental
distinction between causation and constitution, as I explain
above.
While I reject the characterization of my approach to pro-
cess tracing as reducible to the accounts offered by Pearl and
Woodward, I do see my project of qualitative causal inference
as affiliated with work by philosophers that seeks to integrate
difference-making and production accounts. I would continue
to insist, however, that production accounts are more funda-
mental; we can logically derive relations of counterfactual de-
pendence from causal mechanisms but I do not believe that
the converse is necessarily true.29
But to make ontological claims about mechanisms is not
to deny the epistemological relevance of counterfactuals. There
is a big difference between the claim that causation consists of
a particular type of counterfactual dependence, a claim that I
reject, and the claim that causation consists of causal mecha-
nisms whose productive capacities logically imply counter-
factual dependence, a claim I endorse. Therefore, when pro-
cess tracers invoke mechanisms, it should not give them li-
cense to ignore the fundamental problem of causal inference,
which is a fundamental problem precisely because observa-
tions about counterfactuals are missing data. Process tracers
28
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do themselves no favor when they reject the fundamental prob-
lem of causal inference as relevant only to quantitative analy-
sis. The problem is a logical consequence of any causal rela-
tionship, regardless of the method used to investigate that
relationship.
In his contribution to this symposium, Bennett also ex-
presses concern about the adequacy of the completeness stan-
dard, concern that stems from his skepticism that the standard
sufficiently addresses the practice of process tracing.  Bennett
has done more than anybody to develop the practice of pro-
cess tracing over the past dozen years and so his comments
deserve very close attention. I believe his most fundamental
point is that I underestimate the extent to which “explanations
of cases and populations will always be potentially fallible.”
Using slightly different language, however, I made the same
claim in the chapter I contributed to his recent edited volume,
where I wrote that the standard is intended to justify the claim
that a causal explanation “has weathered sufficient scrutiny
relative to its rivals and to the current state of theory and data
gathering that belief in its approximate truth is more reason-
able than disbelief but is also subject to revision in the face of
future data gathering or theorizing.”30 I believe we agree on
this point.
Furthermore, I think Bennett’s claim betrays some misap-
prehension of the goal of the completeness standard. The goal
of the standard is not to achieve fallibility and certainty. The
goal of the standard is to justify unit-level causal inference in
light of the fundamental problem of causal inference, which
denies that such inferences are possible. The appropriate con-
trast, then, is not certain inference versus uncertain inference
but rather valid inference versus invalid inference. Insofar as
the standard accomplishes its goal, it permits unit-level causal
inferences that, like all inferences, will be fallible; that is to
say, we will always be uncertain about our inferences precisely
because they are inferences. Indeed, the standard allows us to
form a typology of the sources of uncertainty; we may have
uncertainty about the causal graph itself, uncertainty about
inferences from the event-history maps to the causal graphs,
and uncertainty about the identification and validation of causal
mechanisms.  Uncertainty about any element of the standard—
concerns about the sufficiency of the causal graph, about the
degree of evidentiary support for the event-history maps, or
uncertainty about mechanisms—will translate directly into
uncertainty about the explanation. But, to use a Bayesian frame-
work, we can still update our posterior beliefs about the valid-
ity of the explanation.31 All I wish to say at this point is to make
the conditional claim that if the standard is met, then unit-level
causal inference can be justified.
Therefore, I agree with Bennett that no explanation is ever
truly complete.32 We make fallible judgments about the suffi-
30
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ciency of a causal graph, about the adequacy of evidence for
descriptive inferences, about the credibility of alternative hy-
pothesis, and about the significance of omitted variable bias.
Bennett’s work is absolutely invaluable in thinking about these
crucial topics. The completeness standard is an aspirational
standard against which we judge specific process-tracing re-
search and therefore judge it as more or less complete and
therefore more or less supportive of a valid causal inference. It
is true that all causal models simplify and thus leave some
relevant causal knowledge unstated; causal graphs, after all,
encode qualitative relationships. Bennett criticizes me for not
stating explicitly that combustion requires gravity; but if we
take Bennett at his word, all of our causal arguments are going
to be burdened by enumerating relevant background condi-
tions like gravity, oxygenation, and pretty much all physical
laws. Causal models may also, of course, suffer from omitted
variable bias; this is the existential fact of all science.33
Bennett thus raises critical points that have not yet been
fully addressed in the completeness standard. I believe his
concerns can be accommodated in future iterations of the stan-
dard, in part by drawing on his work, and so I thank him deeply
for raising them. I do not agree, however, that these concerns
add up to a fundamental critique of the approach as a standard
of causal inference.
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Do New Accounts of Causal
Mechanisms Offer Practical
Advice for Process Tracing?
Andrew Bennett
Georgetown University
ward’s manipulationist account of causation and the defini-
tion George and I used in 2005.  It then assesses whether and
how David Waldner’s account of the potential completeness
of explanations, building on Pearl’s work and also related to
Woodward’s conception of “invariance,” and Rosa Run-hardt’s
approach to using counterfactual analysis, building on
Woodward’s concepts, offer practical advice for process trac-
ing in political science case studies.6 I conclude that Waldner’s
account demands more than process tracing can deliver, and
Runhardt’s suggestion needs additional development to sys-
tematize the kinds of counterfactual analysis that process trac-
ers already carry out. Yet these are promising lines of develop-
ment that deserve continued research.
Defining Causal Mechanisms:
Wesley Salmon versus James Woodward
In the 1980s and later, Wesley Salmon developed what is known
as the causal mechanical approach to causal explanation.7 In
this account, a causal process is a physical process that trans-
mits what Salmon termed a mark between one physical entity
and another. A mark is a change in physical structure that
persists beyond the interaction of the first and second entity
in the absence of any further causal interactions. Building on
Salmon’s discussion of causal mechanisms, Alexander George
and I defined causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable
physical, social, or psychological processes through which
agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific con-
texts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to
other entities, [thereby changing] the affected entity’s charac-
teristics, capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until
subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.”8 We noted the
obvious inferential challenges of measuring the effects of par-
ticular mechanisms, isolating them from other mechanisms, and
assessing the conditions under which particular mechanisms
are activated, and we discussed the ways in which process
tracing could address (but not in any ultimate or decisive sense
resolve) these inferential challenges.
Given the lags involved in researching, writing, and pub-
lishing our book, and given that George and I were autodidacts
in the philosophy of science, we were not aware that James
Woodward9 had already convincingly critiqued Salmon’s defi-
nition. Woodward notes that Salmon’s account of mark trans-
mission encounters problems in explaining, for example, the
motion of billiard balls after their collision, which relies on
knowing the masses and velocities of the balls before the col-
lision, the assumption of a perfectly elastic collision, and the
hypothesized mechanism of the conservation of linear mo-
mentum. As Woodward points out, Salmon’s account of mark
transmission does not distinguish between the explanatorily
relevant momentum of the balls and explanatorily irrelevant
features like the transmission of a chalk mark from one ball to
6
 Runhardt 2016; Waldner 2016.
7
 Salmon 1989.
8
 George and Bennett 2005, 137; see also Bennett and Checkel
2015, 12.
9
 Woodward 2003.
When Alexander George and I wrote our 2005 book, Case Stud-
ies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, a central
theme was that theories about causal mechanisms, and pro-
cess tracing analysis of the observable implications of hy-
pothesized causal mechanisms, were central to qualitative case
study research. Our emphasis on causal mechanisms was not
especially novel at the time, but it ran counter to the preemi-
nent role that Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba
devoted to causal effects, and in the intervening years causal
mechanisms have gained added attention from social scien-
tists.1
At the time we wrote our book, we based our definition of
causal mechanisms largely on that of Wesley Salmon, the phi-
losopher of science whose concept resonated most closely
with our own understanding of mechanisms. Being political
scientists rather than philosophers of science, we were not
aware, in those days before Google Scholar, that James Wood-
ward, building on his earlier work and on work by Judea Pearl,
had critiqued Salmon’s definition and pushed forward the philo-
sophical discussion of causal mechanisms.2
The present symposium on causal mechanisms is thus an
opportune time to examine whether the latest philosophical
discussions of causal mechanisms offer practical advice for
political scientists engaged in process tracing. In particular,
two suggestions for improved process tracing practices de-
serve attention: 1) the construction of directed acyclic graphs3
and the use of such graphs to improve upon and assess the
completeness of explanations based on process tracing;4 and,2)
the use of counterfactual analysis in process tracing.5
The present article first notes the differences between the
understanding of causal mechanisms that emerges from Wood-
Andrew Bennett is Professor of Government at Georgetown Uni-
versity. He can be reached at BennettA@Georgetown.edu.
1
 King, Keohane and Verba 1994.
2
 Woodward 2003; Pearl 2000.
3
 Pearl 2000; Knight and Winship 2013.
4
 Waldner 2012, 2015, and 2016.
5
 Runhardt 2015. For present purposes I do not address recent
contributions to more formal Bayesian process tracing (Bennett 2015,
Fairfield and Charman forthcoming), which I believe are beginning to
offer very useful guidelines for process tracing even if further re-
search is needed on how much and what kind of Bayesian formaliza-
tion is practically useful in carrying out and writing up process trac-
ing research.
